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Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Plaintiffs/Appellants Ruf, Inc. and Donald M. Dudley 
("Buyers") petition the Court for a rehearing on its affirmation 
of the trial court!s grant of Summary Judgment in favor of 
Defendant/Appellees Icelandic Investments, Inc. and Robert 
Johnson ("Sellers") which the Court based upon the Buyers' 
failure to mitigate their damages. The Buyers also request 
rehearing on the Court's affirmation of the trial court's grant 
of Summary Judgment to Defendant/Appellee VR Utah, Inc. 
("Broker") based upon the Release of Liability in the contract. 
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
This litigation centers on a transaction wherein the Buyers 
purchased a business from Sellers, which purchase was brokered by 
the Broker. In connection with the sale, the Sellers, at the 
Broker's behest, made an admittedly material misrepresentation 
that there was no pending litigation against the business. As 
Buyers later learned, there was pending litigation seeking in 
excess of $80,000, more than the purchase price of the business. 
Buyers, upon learning of the litigation by being named as a 
party, brought suit against Sellers and Broker asserting claims 
for Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation. Sellers 
counterclaimed for the balance of the purchase price remaining 
unpaid. 
The trial court granted summary judgment against Buyers and 
in favor of Sellers on all claims and counterclaims. On April 1, 
1999, this Court rendered its decision in this case in a 
Memorandum Decision, Case No. 971691-CA, Ruf, Inc. et. al. v. 
Icelandic Investments, Inc. et. al.. A copy of that Memorandum 
Decision is attached as Addendum "A". In that decision, the 
Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Sellers on Buyers' claims for fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation. The Court based its decision on its belief 
that the undisputed facts show that Buyers failed to attempt to 
obtain financing elsewhere once the initial source fell through. 
Because Buyers failed to mitigate his damages, the Court held the 
Buyers were not entitled to recover damages "for any harm that 
could have been avoided by the use of reasonable effort...." See 
Memorandum Decision, p. 3. The Court in so stating, however, did 
not follow its own precedent, and that of the Utah Supreme Court, 
because mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense which 
requires the defendant (i.e., Sellers) to put forth specific 
evidence that the plaintiff (i.e., Buyers) failed to take 
reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages. 
In addition, the Court affirmed the Summary Judgment granted 
to Broker on the basis of the Release of Liability clause in the 
contract at issue because that clause "defined the roles" of the 
parties and Buyers affirmatively disclaimed any reliance on 
broker. This overlooks the facts in the record, however, that 
the Broker affirmatively encouraged Sellers to lie to Buyers and 
conceal a material fact. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE ITS DECISION ON SELLERS' SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST BUYERS. 
A. Mitigation is an Affirmative Defense and Sellers Did 
not Show a Failure to Take Reasonable Steps To 
Mitigate. 
This Court should reverse its prior decision upholding the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Sellers 
because Sellers failed to meet their affirmative burden of 
presenting evidence that Buyers failed to take reasonable steps 
to mitigate their damages. The Court upheld the summary 
judgment on the following grounds: 
Proof of damages is a required element of fraud or negligent 
misrepresentation [Buyers] argue that they lost their 
source of financing due to the misrepresentation, and thus 
have demonstrated damages. However, this assertion of 
damage is legally insufficient to withstand summary 
judgment. The undisputed facts show that [Buyers] failed to 
attempt to obtain financing elsewhere once his initial 
source fell through. Because [Buyer] failed to mitigate his 
damages, he is not entitled to recover damages for any harm 
that he could have avoided by the use of reasonable 
efforts.... To prove damages, [Buyers] must have at least 
attempted to get other financing. Only had he been unable 
to do so, could he then claim the loss of financing as 
legitimate damage. Thus, we affirm the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment to seller. 
Memorandum Opinion, p. 3 (citations omitted). Thus, the Court 
based its decision solely on its view that Buyers failed to 
mitigate their damages and implicitly stated that, absent such a 
failure to mitigate, the loss of financing was sufficient damage 
to defeat summary judgment. 
The flaw in this analysis is that it is the burden of 
Sellers, not Buyers, to show by specific evidence that Buyers 
failed to take reasonable measures to mitigate his damages. The 
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Utah Supreme Court has explicitly stated that it is the 
defendant' s burden to show a failure to mitigate "by producing 
competent evidence proving plaintiff had not taken reasonable 
efforts to mitigate his damages...." Pratt v. Board of Education 
of Uintah Ctv. Sch. Dist., 564 P.2d 294, 298 (Utah 1977). 
Furthermore, this Court in John Call Eng'g v. Manti City 
extensively discussed the issue of mitigation and stated that 
"the defendant has the burden of proving that damages shown could 
have been minimized." John Call Eng'g v. Manti City, 795 P.2d 
678, 680 (Utah App. 1990)(quoting D.Dobbs. Remedies, § 12.6, at 
830 (1973)) (emphasis added). [T]he doctrine requires defendant 
to show with specificity why the damages sought are not 
proper because of successful efforts to mitigate or failure to 
reasonably mitigate. Id. at 681 (emphases added). Thus, it is 
Sellers* burden to come forward with specific evidence that 
Buyers failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate their damages. 
Sellers have completely failed to produce such evidence. 
The facts are somewhat similar to those in Pratt in which the 
defendant claimed that the plaintiff had failed to mitigate his 
damages after losing his job at the school district. Pratt, 564 
P.2d at 295. The school district sought to instruct the jury on 
the issue of mitigation. However, the trial court denied this 
request because the school district had failed to put forth 
sufficient evidence. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed this 
decision and stated that, because mitigation is an affirmative 
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defense, the burden of proof is upon the defendant to show that 
the plaintiff either found, or, by the exercise of proper 
industry in the search, could have procured other employment.... 
Id. at 297 (quoting Williston on Contracts (3rd Ed.) Sec. 1360, 
pp. 312-313) (emphasis added). Thus, the defendant, in this case 
Sellers, had the burden of showing that Buyers, through the 
exercise of proper industry in the search, could have procured 
alternative financing in order for failure to mitigate to be a 
proper defense. However, Sellers have not introduced one shred 
of evidence on the record that Buyers could have obtained such 
financing under the circumstances. Sellers would have to show by 
affirmative evidence that an individual just out of college, with 
no assets, no collateral, no inventory, no borrowing history, no 
profit history, with an outstanding debt of $100,000 and with a 
lawsuit against him for over $80,000 could have obtained 
financing through reasonable efforts. Not only have Sellers not 
done so, they have not even attempted to do so. 
This Court has improperly shifted the burden to Buyers to 
produce evidence that they mitigated their damages in order to 
avoid summary judgment against them. The burden of showing a 
failure to mitigate damages falls, however, solely upon Sellers 
and they have failed to meet this burden by producing any 
evidence that Buyers could have obtained financing under these 
circumstances. Summary Judgment in Sellers1 favor was therefore 
inappropriate and should be reversed. 
In addition, even if Buyers were required to produce 
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evidence of mitigation to defeat summary judgment, the Court 
failed to take into account that Buyers did in fact produce 
evidence that the failure to seek alternative financing was 
reasonable.1 Given this evidence, summary judgment on this 
basis was error and, at the least, the question should be decided 
by a jury. Although the Utah courts have not explicitly stated as 
such, the law is clear that the reasonableness of the plaintiff s 
actions in mitigating damages is a question of fact for a jury. 
See, e.g.. Flint v. Hart, 917 P.2d 590, 596 (Wash. App. Div. 3 
1996) (The plaintiff has an obligation to mitigate damages.... 
The reasonableness of his or her conduct in doing so is a 
question for the jury.); Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 946 
P.2d 904, 912 (Idaho 1993) (upholding ruling that property 
owner's refusal to rent property, and thereby mitigate damages, 
would not reduce damage award and stating that, "[w]hether the 
action taken by Mrs. Wayne was reasonable was a question of fact 
. . . . " ) ; Garrett v. Union Pacific R.R., 828 P.2d 994, 997 (Okl. 
App. 1992) ("It is for the jury to decide if Garrett had 
exercised reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages by 
attempting to return to work or find other employment.). 
Thus, the evidence presented in this case, coupled with 
Sellers' complete failure to meet its burden of producing 
evidence that Buyers failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate 
1
 Buyer presented evidence that applying for additional 
financing would have been futile given his financial condition 
and his belief that there was no possible way he would receive 
such financing. See Affidavit of Donald M. Dudley, H 10. [R853-
857] . 
6 
damages, creates, at a minimum, a question of fact concerning 
mitigation for the jury to decide. All inferences must be taken 
in the light most favorable to Buyers and a jury could easily 
decide that the failure to seek alternative financing was 
reasonable, thus negating any claim of failure to mitigate. 
Sellers have completely failed to meet their burden of 
submitting specific evidence that, through reasonable efforts, 
Buyers could have found alternative financing. This alone 
should result in the denial of Sellers' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. In addition, despite having no burden to do so absent 
Sellers' meeting its burden, Buyers have come forward with 
sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact for the jury 
concerning mitigation. As this was the only basis for upholding 
the Summary Judgment, the Court should reverse its prior decision 
and reverse the Summary Judgment. 
B. There is No Basis for Awarding Damages to a 
Seller Who Intentionally Misrepresents a 
Material Fact And The Rescission Issue Was 
Overlooked By The Court. 
The Court, in its decision, did not address the award of the 
remaining contract balance to Sellers or the issue of rescission. 
Sellers admit that they made a misrepresentation to Buyers 
concerning the outstanding litigation and that such a 
misrepresentation was material. The trial court's award to 
Sellers of the balance of the contract defies both logic and 
justice. Even if the Court does not allow Buyers to recover 
their damages, the Court should, at a minimum, reverse the trial 
court's summary judgment against Buyers for the contract price 
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and allow Buyers to seek recision on the basis of fraud. Summary 
Judgment for the contract balance means that Sellers will profit 
from an admittedly fraudulent transaction. The Court should not 
allow such an award to stand. 
Buyers pleaded rescission as an express defense to Seller's 
counterclaim seeking to recover the balance of the purchase price 
owed under the contract. Buyers, in their Answer to the 
counterclaim, expressly plead: 
The Note which is the subject of the Counterclaim is subject 
to rescission given the conduct of the [Sellers] as alleged 
in the Complaint which is incorporated by this reference. 
Despite the existence of this affirmative defense, neither the 
trial court nor this Court addressed that well-plead rescission 
defense in granting and affirming judgment in Sellers' favor on 
its counterclaim. The rescission defense precludes recovery on 
the Note and judgment in Sellers' favor on the counterclaim was 
error.2 
II. BROKER SHOULD NOT BE IMMUNIZED FROM ITS AFFIRMATIVE ATTEMPT 
TO INDUCE FRAUDULENT CONDUCT. 
The Court should also reverse its decision upholding summary 
judgment in favor of Broker which was based upon Article XX of 
the contract at issue which stated that Buyer acknowledges that 
Broker has not verified or will not verify the representations of 
the Seller. See Memorandum Decision, p. 2. However, this is not 
2
 While the rescission by Buyers in this case is clear, 
in the event there is any question regarding rescission it is a 
question of fact which would preclude the entry of summary 
judgment and requires reversal. E.g., Knudsen Music Co. v. 
Masterson, 121 Utah 252, 256, 240 P.2d 973, 975 (1952) (citations 
omitted). 
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an instance in which the Buyer seeks to hold the Broker 
responsible merely for misrepresentations made by the Seller, in 
which case the clause might arguably apply. Here, it is 
undisputed that the Broker affirmatively encouraged the Sellers 
to lie to the Buyers concerning a material fact of the 
transaction. This conduct goes well beyond the Broker 
fulfilling its "defined role" as a party from whom no 
representations could be relied upon. The Court has essentially 
stated that a party can actively take part in fraudulently 
concealing a fact that it knows to be true and material to the 
transaction and then simply insulate itself from liability with a 
clause in the fraudulently obtained contract. This is clearly 
against public policy and directly contrary to the Utah Supreme 
Court's discussion in Ong Int'1 (U.S.A.) v. 11th Avenue Corp., 
850 P.2d 447, 453 (Utah 1993) . The Broker, however, went well 
beyond its role and actively encouraged Sellers to commit fraud. 
The language of Article XX simply does not support the Court's 
interpretation and, if it did, the clause itself would be void 
for fraud and against public policy. The Court should therefore 
alter its decision and reverse the trial court* s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Broker. 
III. CERTIFICATION. 
The undersigned certifies, pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, that the petition is presented in 
good faith and not for delay. 
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CONCLUSION. 
For the above stated reasons, Buyers respectfully request 
that the Court of Appeals revisit its prior ruling and reverse 
the trial court's summary judgments in favor of Sellers and 
Brokers. Otherwise, the undisputed, intentional, fraudulent 
conduct of both Sellers and Broker will be rewarded and the 
victim of such fraud will not receive recompense. Such a result 
would be unjust and contrary to Utah law. 
DATED this \<^ day of April, 1999. 
ATKIN Sc LILJA, P.C. 
£han L. HawKiTrs \ 
Attorneys 'for Appellafvt^ s, 
Donald M. Dudley and Ruf, Inc. 
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